KLAIM is an experimental programming language that supports a programming paradigm where both processes and data can be moved across di erent computing environments. This paper presents the mathematical foundations of the KLAIM type system; this system permits checking access rights violations of mobile agents. Types are used to describe the intentions (read, write, execute, : : :) of processes relative to the di erent localities with which they are willing to interact, or to which they want to migrate. Type checking then determines whether processes comply with the declared intentions, and whether they have been assigned the necessary rights to perform the intended operations at the speciÿed localities. The KLAIM type system encompasses both subtyping and recursively deÿned types. The former occurs naturally when considering hierarchies of access rights, while the latter is needed to model migration of recursive processes.
Introduction
Network computing is calling for new programming paradigms and for new programming languages that model interactions among clients and servers by means of mobile agents; these are programs that are transported and executed on di erent hosts. Security, i.e. privacy and integrity of data, is a key issue in the development of mobile applications. One can easily imagine malicious mobile agents attempting to access private information, or modifying private data. Hence, a server receiving a mobile This work has been partially supported by Esprit Working Groups CONFER2 and COORDINA, and by CNR Projects Modelli e Metodi per la Matematica e l'Ingegneria and Metodologie e Strumenti di Analisi, Veriÿca e Validazione di Sistemi Software A dabili.agent for execution needs to impose strong requirements to ensure that the incoming agent does not violate privacy and jeopardize the integrity of the information. Similarly, mobile agents need tools to ensure that their execution at the server site does not compromise their integrity or security.
Programming languages for mobile agents are based on policies (both at compilation and run time) that restrict privileges and capabilities more than needed. This may unnecessarily reduce the expressive power (and the capabilities) of mobile agents. Moreover, it might not be obvious how to guarantee that certain desired security properties are enforced by the language implementation. More generally, there is a lack of formal foundations to express and prove desired security properties of programs.
Recently, several researchers have explored the possibility of considering security issues at the level of language design aiming at embedding protection mechanisms in the languages. For instance, the language Java [7] exploits type information as a foundation of its security: well-typed Java programs (and the corresponding veriÿed bytecode) will never compromise the integrity of certain data. In the area of functional programming, type systems are successfully used to avoid programming errors (type safety) by means of checks at compile time. Types are used to deÿne the notion of well-behaved programs, and only programs that comply with the requirement of the type system are executed.
In this paper we discuss the design of the security type system for KLAIM (a Kernel Language for Agents Interaction and Mobility) [18] , an experimental programming language speciÿcally designed for programming mobile agents. KLAIM uses types to protect resources and data and to express and enforce policies for access control. The type system is used to guarantee that the operations that processes intend to perform at various network sites comply with the processes' access rights.
KLAIM supports a programming paradigm where programs can migrate from one computing environment to another. The language consists of core Linda [22, 15] with multiple located tuple spaces and of a set of process operators, borrowed from Milner's CCS [28] . KLAIM tuple spaces and processes are distributed over di erent localities, which are considered as ÿrst-class data. Linda operations are indexed with the locations of the tuple space they operate on. This allows programmers to distribute=retrieve data and processes over=from di erent nodes directly. Programmers share their control with what we call the net coordinators. Net coordinators describe the distributed infrastructure necessary for managing physical distribution of processes, allocation policies, and agents mobility.
Let us now see how a system composed of a process Server and two identical processes Client can be programmed in KLAIM . Afterwards, we shall see how types can be used to specify and enforce access control polices. The server process is programmed in KLAIM as follows:
Server def = out(l)@self: nil:
Server ÿrst adds a tuple that contains the locality l (out(l)) to its local tuple space (@self), then evolves to the terminated process nil. The client process is programmed as follows: Client def = read(! u)@l S : eval(P)@u:nil:
Client ÿrst accesses the tuple space located at l S to read an address u (read(! u)@l S , where ! u is a formal variable), then sends process P for execution at u (eval(P)@u), ÿnally evolves to nil.
A net coordinator might allocate Server on site s (this implies that self is bound to s) and the two processes Client on sites s 1 and s 2 . At both these sites, care is taken that l S is bound to s; this allows clients to interact with the server.
KLAIM types provide information about the intentions of processes: downloading= consuming a tuple, producing a tuple, activating a process, and creating a new tuple space. We will use {r; i; o; e; n} to indicate the set of capabilities, where each symbol stands for the operation whose name begins with it; r denotes the capability of executing a read operation, i stands for in, o for out, e for eval, and n for newloc. Semantically, types are functions mapping localities (and locality variables) into functions from sets of capabilities to types. The KLAIM type system encompasses both subtyping and recursively deÿned types. Subtyping naturally emerges when considering hierarchies of access rights. Recursive types are used for dealing with mobile recursive agents.
The typing analysis of KLAIM programs is structured in two phases re ecting the twolevel syntax of KLAIM . The ÿrst phase deduces the intentions of processes relatively to the di erent localities they are willing to interact with or they want to migrate to. This is obtained by means of an inference system that statically assigns types to processes, and checks whether processes behave in accordance with their declared intentions. All rules of the system are syntax driven and such that for any process there exists a minimal type smaller than all the types deducible for it.
The second phase statically checks whether each process has the necessary rights to perform the intended operations, i.e. whether the process violates the access rights as granted by the net coordinator. Capabilities are used di erently by processes and net coordinators. The capabilities associated to a locality (or to a locality variable) ', within a process type carry information about the operations the process intends to perform at '. Net coordinators use capabilities to specify the access policy of each site of a net in terms of access rights and execution privileges. In practice, net coordinators statically decorate each node of a net by a unique type that codiÿes the policy for controlling access from that node to the other nodes of the net. A net is called welltyped whenever, for any site, the types of the processes allocated on that site are not greater than the type of the site.
The role of the two phases is illustrated by the client=server system described above. If process P has type P , the outcome of the ÿrst stage of typing analysis of Client is the type c = l S → {r} → ⊥; u → {e} → P :
It states that Client intends to perform a read operation at locality l S and intends to send a process with type P for execution at the locality denoted by u.
Let us assume that the net coordinator grants the following access rights to the sites s 1 and s 2 where Client is duplicated: s1 = s → {r} → ⊥; u → {e} → P ; s2 = s → {r} → ⊥; then only the process located at s 1 has the right of sending processes with type P for execution at u. Indeed, the net where s is the type of site s, is not well-typed. By relying on static typing and dynamic type checking, we prove that well-typedness is an invariant of the operational semantics (subject reduction) and that well-typed nets are free from run time errors caused by misuse of access rights (type safety). Dynamic type checking is necessary because the creation of new sites modiÿes the types of the other sites of the net and is useful for controlling (typed) data exchange.
This paper provides the mathematical foundations of the KLAIM type system. Its main technical contribution is a subject reduction theorem and a type safety theorem. We also prove the decidability of the type system and provide an algorithm to compute types of processes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the syntax and the informal semantics of KLAIM processes, types and nets. Section 3 deÿnes type equality and the subtyping relation, while Section 4 deÿnes the type inference system for deriving process types and introduces the notion of well-typed net. Section 5 deÿnes the operational semantics of KLAIM processes and nets. Section 6 states and proves the subject reduction theorem and the type safety theorem for our type system. Section 7 contains a few programming examples. For the sake of readability, detailed proofs of syntactical properties of the type system are postponed to Section 8. The ÿnal section contains comparisons with related work and hints for further research.
Klaim and its informal semantics
KLAIM consists of a core Linda with multiple tuple spaces and of a set of operators, borrowed from Milner's CCS [28] . A distinguishing feature is that tuples and operations over them are located at speciÿc sites of a net and types are used to control access rights of processes over these sites. We start this section by summarizing the main features of Linda (the interested reader is referred to, e.g., [23, 16, 15] for more details). Then, we present the syntax of KLAIM (processes, types and nets).
Most of the presentation of the untyped part of the language is borrowed from [18] . There, we also outline the main features of the KLAIM type system without providing the actual syntax for types, the explicit notion of run time error and the proofs of the subject reduction theorem and of the type safety theorem.
Linda is a coordination language that relies on an asynchronous and associative communication mechanism based on a shared global environment called tuple space (TS). A tuple space is a multiset of tuples, that are sequences of actual ÿelds, i.e.
expressions or values, and formal ÿelds, i.e. variables. Pattern matching is used to select tuples in a TS. Two tuples match if they have the same number of ÿelds and corresponding ÿelds have matching values or variables; variables match any value of the same type, and two values match only if they are identical. Linda provides just four main primitives for handling tuples: two (non-blocking) operations add tuples to a TS, two (possibly blocking) operations access tuples in the TS.
The Linda asynchronous communication model allows programmers to explicitly control process interactions via shared data and to use the same set of primitives both for data manipulation and for process synchronization. This has the advantage of rendering explicit all the interactions of a program with its environment. The original Linda primitives are, however, not completely adequate for distributed programming; data protection and security, which are key features of mobile applications, are problematic because the Linda communication model cannot guarantee data privacy. Distribution and access control are the main concerns of our contribution.
Klaim processes
Hereafter, we shall exploit the syntactic categories listed below; all of them are followed by the symbols we will use (sometimes with indices) to refer to their elements.
S (s) is a set of sites (or physical localities), Loc (l) is a set of (logical) localities, Vloc (u) is a set of locality variables, Val (v) is a set of basic values, Var (x) is a set of value variables, Exp (e) is the category of value expressions, (X ) is a set of process variables and (A) is a set of parameterized process identiÿers.
A site can be considered as the address (or the name) of a node where processes and tuple spaces might be located. Localities are the symbolic names of sites and programmers are not required to know the precise mapping of localities on sites. Localities allow programmers to structure programs over distributed environments while ignoring the precise allocations of processes and data. A distinguished locality self (∈ Loc) is assumed that programs can use to refer to their own execution site. The set of locality variables, Vloc, is partitioned into two subsets, NVloc and TVloc. Variables in NVloc are used to create new sites (i.e. as arguments of newloc), and variables in TVloc are used to bind localities (i.e. as formals of tuples). Expressions are built up from values and value variables, by using a set of operators (not speciÿed here). Parameters of process identiÿers can be processes, localities and values, and they are provided in this order.
We sometimes use ' to denote both localities and locality variables. Moreover, we write· to denote a sequence of objects and {·} to denote the set of objects in·.
KLAIM terms are obtained from the abstract syntax in Table 1 . Process and locality variables are typed whenever they are bound; for the sake of simplicity, value variables are kept untyped. The precise syntax of types, that are ranged over by , will be introduced in the next section.
Fields, ranged over by f, can be actual ÿelds (i.e. expressions, processes, localities or locality variables) and formal ÿelds. To avoid confusing names with formal ÿelds Table 1 Process syntax P ::= nil (null process) a:P (action preÿxing)
these are denoted by "! var", where var is a generic variable. Tuples, ranged over by t, are sequences of ÿelds; hence, for a tuple t, {t} will denote the set of ÿelds of t. KLAIM processes may access tuple spaces through explicit naming: operations are indexed with the locality of the tuple space. The (non-blocking) operation out(t)@' adds the tuple resulting from the evaluation of t to the TS located at '. Two (possibly blocking) operations, in(t)@' and read(t)@', access tuples in the TS located at '. The operation in(t)@' evaluates t and looks for a matching tuple t in the TS; if t is found, it is removed from the TS. The corresponding values of t are then assigned to the variables of t and the operation terminates. If no matching tuple is found, the operation is suspended until one is available. The operation read(t)@' di ers from in(t)@' only in that the tuple t selected by pattern matching is not removed from the TS.
New threads of executions are dynamically activated through the operation eval(P)@' that spawns a process (whose code is given by P) at the node named '.
Processes can create new sites through the preÿx newloc(u : ), that is not indexed with a locality because it is always executed at the current site (self). This operation creates a "fresh" site that can be accessed via the locality variable u, the type speciÿes the access control policy of this site.
The operators for building processes are commonly used in Process Algebras and aim at modelling basic behaviours of concurrent systems. The expression nil stands for the process that cannot perform any action, a: P stands for the process that ÿrst executes action a and then behaves like P; P 1 | P 2 stands for the parallel composition of P 1 and P 2 , and A P ;';ẽ stands for the invocation of the process identiÿed by A with actual parametersP;' andẽ.
Variables occurring in process terms can be bound by preÿxes and process deÿn-ing equations. More precisely, preÿxes in(t)@': and read(t)@': act as binders for variables in the formal ÿelds of t. Preÿx newloc(u : ): binds the locality variable u. Deÿnition A(X :˜ ;ũ :˜ ;x) def = P is considered as a binder for the variables {X } ∪ {ũ} ∪ {x}. Hereafter, we assume that all bound names in processes are distinct and require that the arguments of eval operations do not contain free process variables.
We will use the standard notation P[e=x] to indicate the substitution of the value expression e for the free occurrences of the variable x in P; P[ẽ=x] will denote the simultaneous substitution of any free occurrence of x ∈ {x} with the corresponding e ∈ {ẽ} in P. In particular, when substitutions refer to locality variables, like P['=u], they have to be applied also to the type speciÿcations therein. Notation P[P=X ;'=ũ;ẽ=x] has the expected meaning.
Process identiÿers are used in recursive process deÿnitions. It is assumed that each process identiÿer A has a single deÿning equation A(X :˜ ;ũ :˜ ;x) def = P, where process and locality parameters are explicitly typed. All free (value, process and locality) variables of P are contained in {X ;ũ;x} and, to guarantee uniqueness of solution of recursive process deÿnitions, all its process variables and identiÿers are guarded, i.e. each process variable=identiÿer occurs within the scope of a blocking in=read preÿx.
A process is a term without free variables; localities occurring in processes are considered as constants. In Section 2.3, we will see that they are names whose meaning is deÿned (i.e. mapped onto sites) by coordinators. Both processes and localities are ÿrst-class data and can be manipulated and generated like any other data occurring in tuples. Processes have higher-order capabilities and can be exchanged when communicating.
Di erently from previous presentations [17, 18] , the operator for explicit nondeterministic composition of processes is not considered. This will considerably simplify the operational semantics while leaving expressivity unchanged. Indeed, this allows us to have a single-level operational semantics instead of the two-level semantics presented in [17, 18] . There, we ÿrst considered the evolution of single processes and then that of whole nets. The two levels enabled us to determine which operand of a nondeterministic composition had been involved in the reduction step of a net. The absence of explicit nondeterministic choice does not in uence expressivity because nondeterminism is inherent in the deÿnition of KLAIM operations. It arises when more in=read operations are suspended while waiting for a tuple or when an in=read operation has more than one matching tuple. In the former case, when a matching tuple becomes available, only one of the suspended operations is nondeterministically selected to proceed; in the latter case, one of the matching tuples is arbitrarily chosen. Hence, within the reduced language, nondeterminism can be modelled via the pattern matching mechanism; but it could also be retrieved like, e.g., in [31] .
There are several process calculi using explicit localities. For instance, localities in D [25] model distribution and mobility of -calculus processes. In the distributed Join calculus [21] , another variant of -calculus, channels have a unique locality and agents may move from a locality to any other locality. In [4] it has been shown that a fragment of the asynchronous -calculus with localities captures the main features of the distributed Join calculus. In [6] localities are used to model failures in fragments of -calculus. Finally, to model distribution of computations and resources over sites of networks, the Ambient calculus [13] and the Seal calculus [37] rely on the notion of execution environment (ambient) rather than on that of locality. 
Klaim types
We will use {r; i; o; e; n U |U ⊆ f NVloc; U = ∅} to indicate the set of process capabilities, where each symbol stands for the operation whose name begins with it; r denotes the capability of executing a read operation, i the capability of executing an in operation, and so on. Capability n, that corresponds to the newloc operations, is indexed by U , a ÿnite, non-empty set of locality variables which will be used to record the set of (references to) sites dinamically created at a given locality. Polarities are non-empty subsets of {r; i; o; e; n}, where n is indexed by U . Union between polarities is standard set union but {n U } ∪ {n U } = {n U ∪U }. We use , ranged over by , to denote the set of all polarities. We will write n in place of n U whenever U can be safely ignored.
KLAIM types are deÿned by the abstract syntax in Table 2 ; there ranges over type variables and denotes the recursive operator. Hereafter, the following notational convention will be used: " →" binds stronger than " ", that binds stronger than ",". From a semantical point of view, a type is a ÿnite map that assigns functions from polarities to types to both localities and locality variables.
The type ⊥ denotes "void", i.e. no intention is declared by the process, and, semantically, corresponds to the smallest type. Conversely, the type denotes the intention of performing any kind of operations and is the greatest type. A type of the form ' → → describes the intention of performing the actions corresponding to the polarity at ', moreover it imposes constraint on the processes that could possibly be executed at '. Hence, the arrow type operator has the usual meaning of logical implication. The type 1 ; 2 is the union of types 1 and 2 ; semantically, it is their least upper bound. Recursive types are used for typing migrating recursive processes.
A type generated from the grammar in Table 2 is such that any recursive type : occurring in does not contain on the left of →. This is a simpliÿcation of the notion of positive type of [5] . The fact that we only deal with a restricted form of types will be essential in the deÿnition of subtyping.
A consequence of our requirement that each process variable=identiÿer in process deÿnitions be guarded (i.e. occurs within the scope of a blocking in=read preÿx) is the fact that we only use recursive types : whose body can be written as 1 ; : : : ; n and at least one of the i has the form ' → → (for some ', and such that {r; i} ∩ = ∅). In the following, we will only consider types that satisfy the condition above and are such that in types of the form ' → → if e ∈ then = ⊥; they will be called legal types. Note that the syntax in Table 2 is less restrictive; it also permits types of the form : . The following notion will be useful in later proofs.
Deÿnition 2.1. The set Sub( ) of subterms of a type is the set of types inductively deÿned as follows:
Finiteness of the sets of subterms for recursive types has been proven in [12] ; it also holds for Sub( ).
In the rest of this paper we will extensively use systems of (possibly mutually recursive) type equations for deÿning n-tuples of types. The solution of a set of n type equations { 1 = 1 ; : : : ; n = n }; where 1 ; : : : ; n are all the free type variables occurring in 1 ; : : : ; n , is the n-tuple of types * 1 ; : : : ; * n obtained by standard iterative techniques (see, e.g. [36] ). Before ending the section, we would like to remark that recursive processes do not necessarily have recursive types. Recursive types arise when typing recursive processes that can migrate. For instance, let us consider the Client=Server system presented in the Introduction. A di erent client process can be programmed as follows:
Suppose, for simplicity, that P has no recursion and does not call (even indirectly) process Client 1 . The type inferred for Client 1 will be c , the same type as the one derived for process Client in the introduction. Instead, consider process
and again suppose that P has no recursion and does not call (even indirectly) process Client 2 . The type of process Client 2 now will be the solution of the following recursive type equation in the type variable :
Intuitively, the resulting type states that Client 2 intends to perform read operations at l S and to migrate to (the locality denoted by) u together with a process with type P .
Klaim nets
A node is a 4-tuple (s; P s ; s ; s ) where s is a site, P s is the process located at s, s is the type of s specifying the access control policy of s, and s is the allocation environment of s, i.e. a (partial) function from localities to sites. We write s :: s s P s to denote the node (s; P s ; s ; s ).
Hereafter, E denotes the set of environments, the empty environment, and {s=l} the environment that maps the locality l on the site s. We use '{ } to denote ('), if (') is deÿned, and ', otherwise; moreover, [s='] denotes the environment such that (') = s and (' ) = (' ) for ' = '.
To specify the mutual access policies of a set of nodes, hence to consistently assign types to sites=nodes, we make use of a partial function that, for each site s, describes the access rights of s on the other sites. Function is used to derive a system of type equations whose solution will give the types of the nodes. Types of nodes have the same syntax as types of processes. However, strictly speaking, the formers cannot be generated by the grammar given in Table 2 , since we required ' to stand for localities and locality variables. For types of nodes, we let ' range over sites. Condition 1. expresses that the local allocation environment of a node maps localities on the sites of the net; in particular, self is mapped on the name (site) of the node. Moreover, the type of the node is determined by the function associated to the net. The idea underlying condition 2. is that the nodes of a net over the same site do have the same allocation environment and type as well.
In the following, we will write N instead of N : whenever unambiguous. Given a net N , we assume existence of a function st that returns all sites of N and write N S for a net N such that st(N ) = S. Nets will also be written according to the syntax in Table 3 . This notation will be used in Section 5 in giving the operational semantics of nets.
Type equality and subtyping
This section introduces the equality relation on types and the subtyping relation. Table 4 Type equalities
Equalities on union types
Equalities on recursive types
if is contractive in (contraction)
Type equality
The equality relation will be particularly useful for reducing any (legal) type to a canonical form.
Deÿnition 3.1. The type equality relation, ∼ = is the least congruence that satisÿes the rules in Table 4 .
Laws (1) - (3) state that union types are considered as equal modulo commutativity, associativity and idempotence of their components. Law (4) states that the empty type adds no information, while (5) states that the universal type makes the strongest requirements. Law (6) states that the union of two arrow types tagged with the same locality is the least upper bound with respect to the partial ordering on arrow types that will be formalized in the next section.
The remaining rules amount to stating that recursive types are equal if they denote recursive equations with equal canonical solutions. Law (7) is a generalization to union types of standard -renaming on recursive types; indeed, : = : [ = ] follows from (3) and (7) . Moreover, by (7), the type : 1 ; : 2 is considered as equal to :( 1 ; 2 ) in accordance with the intuition behind union types. Laws (8) and (9) are part of the standard axiomatization of equality on recursive types. Namely, (8) equates two recursive types with equal (possibly inÿnite) expansions. Notice that, by (8) ,
: ∼ = if does not occur in . However, (8) is still too weak: we also need (9) for proving 1 : 2 : ∼ = : [ = 1 ; = 2 ]. Law (9) requires to be contractive in , i.e. occurs in only under → . It is well-known that equality of recursive types (rules (8) and (9) in Table 4 ) is decidable; a simple algorithm can be found in [12] . Table 4 simply extends equality to union types. Since unions are ÿnite, it is easy to verify that equality remains decidable also for our types. Notice that recursive types are regular terms, namely they have ÿnitely many subterms, since unions are ÿnite and are equated up to commutativity, associativity and idempotence of their components.
Let us now deÿne types in canonical form that allow us to minimize the number of components and type constructors, and to simplify case analysis when proving properties. 
where L( ); the set of shallow localities of ; is deÿned inductively on the syntax of as follows:
• all -types : are such that occurs in and it is always "guarded", i.e. on the right of an even number of →'s; moreover, if = 1 ; : : : ; n then i = for all i (16i6k).
The conditions on -types are quite standard, but that on union types is new. Roughly speaking, in a canonical form 1 ; : : : ; n (n¿1) each component i (16i6n) is either a variable or an arrow type, with the additional constraint that all shallow localities be di erent. The condition about shallow localities allows us to easily determine the polarity and the type associated to a given locality within a canonical form. Notice that in a canonical recursive type : , is always contractive in .
In rewriting a type into canonical form, rules (7) - (9) are used for pushing -binders outside as far as possible. Let us see some examples of useful equalities on types.
Note that both are solutions of the equation
• By (7) and (6)
• By (8) and (7), if does not occur in then ; : ∼ = : ( ; ).
By relying on decidability of ∼ = ; we are able to reduce types to a canonical form. The actual proof, that also gives an algorithm for transforming types to canonical forms, can be found in Section 8. For instance, if 1 ; 2 and 3 are canonical forms, then
is a canonical form of the type 1 :'
From now onwards we will only consider types in canonical forms (and their unfoldings). With abuse of notation, we will continue using also to refer to canonical forms.
Subtyping
This section introduces the subtyping relation 4 . If a process P has type and 4 then P could be thought of as a process of type too; any greater type can be assigned to a typable process simply by weakening information about its actual intentions. This is the natural intuition underlying any type-inference system with explicit subsumption. Indeed, according to our deÿnition of subtyping (Table 6) , if P 1 has type 1 ; P 2 has type 2 and 1 4 2 then P 2 intends to perform more operations than P 1 . The subtyping relation between 1 and 2 will allow us to say that P 1 can be safely used in place of P 2 but not the vice versa.
To deÿne the subtyping relation, 4 , we start by introducing an ordering between polarities, namely a hierarchy over access rights. The chosen ordering relies on the following assumptions:
• a process that can perform an in operation is also able to perform a read;
• the ability of performing newloc operations does not depend on the locality variables used; • a process with polarity posses also polarity , for any ⊆ . 
where is a fresh variable ( = ) Deÿnition 3.4. The subpolarity relation, is the least re exive and transitive relation closed under the rules in Table 5 .
It is immediate to see that is decidable (it has ÿnite domain). Notice that polarities only take into account the capabilities of processes associated to given localities, while types consider the intentions of processes, namely they also give an account of the capabilities after migration. The subtype relation below introduces a hierarchy over intentions.
Deÿnition 3.5. The subtyping relation over canonical forms and unfoldings of canonical forms, 4 , is the least relation closed under the rules in Table 6 .
We now comment on the axioms and rules in Table 6 uses this property together with the fact that types are equal up to renaming of bound variables.
One can prove that transitivity is an admissible rule for the subtyping relation (the actual proof is postponed to Section 8). As a consequence, since types are positive and type constructors are monotonic, we have that types are monotonic by type substitution. 
Decidability of subtyping can now be established. The rules in Table 6 are syntaxdriven. Any proof of 1 4 2 can be constructed by a simple two-step algorithm: ÿrst try to prove 1 ∼ = 2 and if you fail then apply the rules backwards in a syntax-directed fashion. Since ∼ = is decidable, the algorithm for establishing 1 4 2 is completely determined once we establish that the axioms (ax⊥), (ax ) and (eq) have priority over the other rules. The proof of decidability, that explicitly deÿnes the algorithm, can be found in Section 8. A more general discussion about equality and subtyping of recursive types can be found in [5] . Moreover, an e cient algorithm for deciding subtyping in the presence of recursive types has been proposed in [27] . In our context, decidability of subtyping involves both union types and recursive types. However, in any type, and then in its canonical forms, recursive types can only occur in positive positions and satisfy the constraints in Deÿnition 3.2, thus restricting the problem of subtyping decidability.
A capability-based type system
This section introduces the type inference system and the notion of well-typed net. The inference system is used in the ÿrst phase of the typing analysis for assigning types to processes.
The type inference system
Type contexts, are functions mapping process variables and identiÿers into types. They are written as sequences of type assignments, i.e. X 1 : 1 ; : : : ; X n : n . The symbol denotes the empty context. Given a type context , we write [ =X ] to denote either the extension of with the assignment X : (when X is unbound in ), or the updating of that binds X to . The auxiliary function update, deÿned structurally over tuples syntax, behaves like the identity function for all ÿelds but ! X : . Formally, it is deÿned by
The type judgments for processes take the form P : where is a type context providing the type of process variables and identiÿers in P. A statement such as P : asserts that, within the context , the intentions of P are those speciÿed by .
In the conclusion of the inference rules, we will write 1 ; 2 to denote the canonical form of the type 1 ; 2 obtained by applying the rules in Table 4 . For instance, we write that from P : ' → → we derive out(t)@' :P : ' → → ; ' → {o} → ⊥ but actually we mean out(t)@' :P : ' → ∪ {o} → .
Notation 4.1. Let be a canonical form. The following notations are inductively deÿned:
where is fresh.
Let us comment on the notations introduced above. ↓ p ' and ↓ t ' are used to denote the polarity and the type associated to ' in , respectively. Type ↓ t ' does not take into account the types relative to those occurrences of ' within that are on the right of → constructors. We use ⇓ t ' to denote the union of all the types associated to the outermost occurrences of ' within . Notice that when ⇓ t is applied to a recursive type, we pick up the union of the types associated to the outermost occurrences of ' in the body of the recursive type. The unfolding takes place only after this type has been obtained; this ensures that ⇓ t ' is well-deÿned. { =='} is used to denote the type obtained from by replacing with the types related to the outermost occurrences of '. Type { } is obtained from by using to interpret shallow localities of .
The rules of the type inference system are given in Table 7 . We will say that a process term P is typable if there exist and such that P : is provable by using the rules in Table 7 .
The type of a process variable (or identiÿer) is completely determined by the type context, . Deÿnedness of (X ) is guaranteed by the fact that processes are closed terms. The simplest process (the null process nil) has no intentions at all. Table 7 KLAIM type inference rules (we assume that A(X : X ;ũ : u;x)
update( ; t) P :
P :
A : P i : i and i 4 Xi for all P i ∈ {P} A P ;';ẽ :
The typing rule for out states that the type of out(t)@' :P extends the capabilities of P at ' with o. Since out is not a binder, P is typed within the same context as out(t)@' :P.
The typing rules for read and in extend the type of P at ' with the corresponding capability (r or i). The type of P is derived in a context updated with the type assignments for the process variables bound by read and in. The rules apply only whenever process P properly use the locality variables bound by read and in. This amounts to saying that, for each locality variable u with type u , the remote operations of P at u ( ⇓ t u) do respect u . The typing rule for eval extends the type of P at ' with e and records that the operations of P at ' have to be extended with those ( ) of the spawned process Q.
The typing rule for newloc extends the type of P at self with n {u} and at u with type ; moreover, it checks whether the operations that P is willing to perform at u ( ⇓ t u) comply with . Notice that the inferred type contains information for mapping locality variable u to the site where the newloc operation is performed when checking well-typedness of a net (see Deÿnition 4.9).
The typing rule for parallel composition states that the intentions of the composed process are the union of those of the components, while the binding context is left unchanged. We would like to remark that also in [20] union types have been used for typing parallel processes.
The typing rule for (possibly recursive) process deÿnition (rule (9)), updates the type context with the types declared for the process variables occurring as parameters in the deÿnition and with the binding between the process identiÿer A and a (possibly recursive) candidate type . The resulting context is exploited to infer (up to type equality) the type for P. Similarly to the typing rules for read and in, for each formal locality variable u i , one checks whether the operations of P at u i (i.e. ⇓ t u i ) match the type declaration ui . Finally, the inferred type is .
The last typing rule is the rule for process invocation. First, it determines the type of the process identiÿer and those of the process arguments. Then, it checks whether the type inferred for any process argument agrees with that of the corresponding formal parameter. No requirement is imposed on the other arguments. Types of locality variables are controlled when one of the rules for in, read and newloc is applied. Types of localities are controlled when well-typedness of nets is checked. The inferred type states that A P ;';ẽ intends to perform at' the same operations of A X ;ũ;x atũ. Soundness of the application of [l=ũ] to follows from the assumption that all bound names in the deÿnition of A are distinct. Table 7 , after recording in the type all the operations the process intends to perform, check this type with subtyping constraints. A type matches these constraints if, and only if, either or a greater do so. From a semantical point of view, premises of the form 4 play the same role of the subsumption rule P :
This rule has not been explicitly introduced because with it we would have lost the guarantee that our type system derives a unique type for any typable non recursive process.
We now prove the following substitution property (for possibly open process terms). We now establish decidability of the type inference system. It is easy to verify that for any process P such that P : may be derived, the following properties hold : 1. if P = nil then = ⊥; 2. if P = X then = (X ); 3. if P = a:Q then is completely determined by the type derived for Q in the context obtained by updating with the types of all the process variables bound by a and, in case a = eval(R)@', by the type derived for R in ; 4. if P = A P ;l;ṽ , where A(X :˜ ;ũ :˜ ;x) def = P, then is completely determined by the types of A,P andX , according to rule (10); 5. if P = Q 1 | Q 2 then is the union of the types of Q 1 and Q 2 .
These properties tell us that the type inference system without rule (9) is monomorphic, i.e. only one type can be deduced in a context for a typable process. The deduced type can be constructed from the syntax of the process by using the types of its subterms. In the case of rule (9) the type inference system behaves di erently. When A(X :˜ ;ũ :˜ ;x) def = P, if A is typable, several types can be assigned to it using rule (9) . However, a minimal type exists such that all the deducible types are greater than it. The proof of this property, that also contains an algorithm to compute the minimal type, can be found in Section 8. for all such that P : . Corollary 4.6. For any typable process P; a minimal type exists such that (i) P : ; (ii) 4 for any such that P : ; (iii) P : is decidable.
Proof. (i) and (ii) follow from Theorem 4.5 and from closedness of P, (iii) follows from (i) and from decidability of 4 .
The main impact of the existence of a minimal type is that the type inference system is decidable.
Corollary 4.7. For any process P; the existence of a type such that P : is decidable.
Well-typed nets
This section introduces the notion of well-typed net. For a net to be well-typed, it will be required that the types of the processes in the net agree with the access rights of the sites where they are located. More speciÿcally, the types of the processes, as determined by the type inference system, are checked against those ÿxed by the net coordinator, while taking into account where each process has been located.
To compare process types as inferred from the inference system with the types of the nodes of the net where processes are allocated, localities have to be mapped into sites by using site allocation environments, i.e. localities must be interpreted. Deÿnition 4.8. The type interpretation function associated to a net N S ; N S : S → E is deÿned as follows: for all s ∈ S, N S (s) = s if s :: s s P ∈ N S , for some s and P.
The type interpretation function is well-deÿned because N S enjoys conditions 1. and 2. of Deÿnition 2.2. We will write N S [ =s] to denote the extension of N S : S → E to s = ∈ S that yields .
Deÿnition 4.9. Given a type interpretation function N S , an s ∈ S and a type , the interpretation { N S } s of in s is (a canonical form of) the type without occurrences of locality variables deÿned inductively on the syntax of as follows:
where [s=U ] denotes the substitution [s=u 1 ; : : : ; s=u n ] if U = {u 1 ; : : : ; u n }.
When inferring types of processes, the locality variables used to denote newly created sites are interpreted just as local sites. The index of capability n serves this purpose: it permits to recover the bindings between locality variables and the site where they are bound. While interpreting an arrow type, to correctly replace all locality variables in , when an n U is encountered, a substitution function is deÿned that is also applied to the context of the arrow type. When interpreting arrow types whose polarities do not contain an indexed n, three di erent subcases, depending on the interpretation of the locality on the left of →, have to be taken into account:
• either the locality can be interpreted as a site of the net, • or the locality is a variable for inputting sites, • or none of the two previous cases arises (e.g. it is a locality that cannot be mapped to a site of the net). Locality variables used in tuples for inputting sites do not give any contribution to the interpreted type because the intentions of processes relative to them are statically checked during the type inference phase. For this reason, the resulting type in the second item above is ⊥. The last item above takes into account localities that cannot be mapped to sites of the net; in this case the type is left unchanged. 
T<f; t= = T<f= ; T<t= Deÿnition 4.10. A net N S is well-typed if for any node s ::
s s P, P is typable and P : , with minimal type for P, implies { N S } s 4 s .
The well-typedness condition implies that processes cannot use a locality if this is not known in the allocation environment of the node.
Operational semantics
The operational semantics of KLAIM nets of processes is presented in Table 11 . To give a simple presentation of the operational rules, the structural congruence, ≡ deÿned as the least congruence relation closed under the rules in Table 10 , is introduced. Hereafter, we use ' for denoting localities, locality variables and sites and assume that allocation environments are extended to sites; over them they act as the identity function. For further explanations and comments we refer the interested reader to [18] .
Like in [19, 33] , we model tuples as processes. To this aim, we extend KLAIM syntax with processes of the form out(et) for denoting evaluated tuples (referred to as et).
The evaluation function for tuples, T< = , makes use of an allocation environment for resolving locality names and relies on an evaluation mechanism, E < =, for closed expressions (i.e. expressions without variables). In Table 8 , that inductively deÿnes T< = , there is only one non-trivial case, namely the evaluation of a process T<P= . This yields a process closure P{ } that stands for the process P packaged with the allocation environment . Note that types assigned to locality and process variables in formals are not "evaluated". They both will be evaluated by the pattern matching predicate when the site to which the locality variable must be bound and the process to which the process variable must be bound are known.
Process closures are evaluated using the least congruence induced by the laws in Table 9 that allow us to push closures inside the structure of processes. In P{ }, a locality ' used in P is interpreted as stated in ; however, can be a "partial" environment, namely there can be localities that are left unchanged when is applied because they are not in its domain. For the evaluation of t{ }, there are two missing cases in the laws in Table 9 . The case '{ } is already covered by the notational Table 9 Closure laws nil{ } = nil
(f; t){ } = f{ }; t{ } convention introduced in Section 2.3. The case P{ } is covered by the laws relative to process closures. The ÿrst two structural laws in Table 10 say that is commutative and associative. The third law permits recollecting (spawning) the null process. The last law relies on the fact that the environments of sites cannot be dynamically modiÿed; hence, it is always possible to distribute (recover) the processes located onto the same node over (from) clones of that node.
We now introduce the notion of conservative extension of the function used to induce the types of the nodes of a net. This notion is used to derive the new types of the nodes of the net in case of dynamic reconÿguration. Indeed, when a new node is created, the types of the nodes of the net have to be "extended" by adding the rights of the existing nodes over the new one and the rights of the new node over the existing ones. For obtaining the type of the new node, ÿrst the type assigned to the locality variable (the argument of newloc) is interpreted by using the local allocation environment. Then, the interpreted type is used to derive the access rights of the new node with respect to the other nodes. Finally, the new types of the nodes of the net are obtained as the solution of a new set of type equations. An extension is called 
s :: P = s :: (P | nil)
s :: (P 1 | P 2 ) = s :: P 1 s :: P 2 "conservative" whenever the type speciÿed by the programmer for the new node is compatible with those induced by the extension. Rule (1) in Table 11 says that the execution of an out operation adds a tuple to a tuple space. The local allocation environment is used both for determining the site where the tuple must be placed and for evaluating the tuple. In particular, if the tuple contains a ÿeld with a process, the corresponding ÿeld of the evaluated tuple contains the process resulting from the evaluation of a closure. Hence, processes in a tuple are transmitted after the interpretation of the used localities by using the local allocation 
environment. This corresponds to having a static scoping discipline for the (remote) generation of tuples.
A dynamic scoping strategy is adopted for the eval operation, described by rule (2) . In this case the localities of the spawned process are not interpreted by using the local allocation environment. Instead, the process is transmitted and its execution can be in uenced by the remote allocation environment.
Rule (3) says that a process can perform an in action by synchronizing with a process which represents a matching tuple et. Matching (deÿned in Table 12 ) takes as arguments the two candidate tuples, the site where the operation is executed, the type of the continuation (that is statically derived and retrieved from the symbol table when it is needed) and the type interpretation function of the net. The result of this synchronization is that tuple et is consumed, i.e. the corresponding process becomes nil, and its values are used to replace, within the process which has performed the in operation, the free occurrences of the corresponding variables of t (this substitution is denoted by [et=T<t= ] ).
Rule (4) can be interpreted similarly to (3) . Only notice that, while in modiÿes the tuple space, read does not; in the conclusions of rule (4) the tuple space is left unchanged by process evolution.
Rules (1) - (4) do not introduce new sites. The creation of a new node, made possible by newloc, is described in rule (5). The new node inherits (part of ) the access rights and all the knowledge of the creating node. The environment of the new node is derived from that of the creating one (with the obvious update for the self locality). The type of the new node is obtained from that associated to the locality variable argument of newloc and from that of the node where the creating process runs, as speciÿed in the notion of conservative extension. Indeed, the creation of a new node s modiÿes the topology of the net, namely the type s of an old node s is "enriched" with the type s → s ↓ p s → s . Thus, any node has a greater type than the one before the inferred reduction. This modiÿcation is necessary to allow operations at s . Finally, rule (6) deals with process invocation while rule (7) is the standard rule that relates operational semantics and structural congruence.
The pattern matching predicate used in Table 11 is deÿned in Table 12 , and relies on the auxiliary predicate s that we introduce below. Predicate s is indexed by the site s received in a communication. The parameters of the predicate are the variable that will be bound to s, the site where the operation is invoked, the type of the continuation and the type interpretation function of the net. Predicate s (u; s ; ; NS ) is satisÿed when the operations that the continuation process P intends to perform at site s, from any site s the process can migrate to, do match the access rights of site s over s.
Matching rules ensure that if read=in looks for sites with type and is the result of interpreting [s=u] , then only sites with type such that 4 would be accepted; while if read=in looks for processes with type then only processes with type whose interpretation is less than or equal to that of would be accepted. Table 13 An additional type inference rule for Table 7 out(et) : ⊥ (11)
Types and reductions
In this section, we state and prove a subject reduction theorem and a type safety theorem. Subject reduction guarantees that well-typedness is an invariant of the operational semantics. Type safety guarantees that well-typed nets are free from run-time errors. Such errors are generated when processes attempt to execute actions that are not permitted by their capabilities. As a result of these two theorems, we have that well-typed nets never encounter run-time errors due to misuse of access rights. In other words, the errors that the KLAIM type system precludes are those due to access right violations.
Before proving these theorems we need to deÿne typing of the auxiliary process out(et). To this purpose the type inference rule in Table 7 is added to those in Table 13 . The rule states that evaluated tuples always have the empty type (since they are represented by passive processes).
To show that well-typedness is an invariant of the operational semantics, we proceed in two steps. First, we prove that well-typedness is preserved under structural congruence; then, we prove that well-typedness is preserved under reduction. Proposition 6.1. If N is well-typed and N ≡ N then N is well-typed.
Proof. By easy inspection of the axioms in Table 10 .
Theorem 6.2 (Subject reduction).
If N S is well-typed and N S N S then N S is welltyped.
Proof. By induction on the length of the derivation of N S N S .
Base step: By case analysis on axioms (1) - (5). Rule (1). Since no new node is created, we must prove that from s = ('), et = T<t= and N S s :: out(t)@' : P s :: P = N S well-typed it follows that N S s :: P s :: P | out(et) = N S is well-typed. The well-typedness hypothesis implies that P { NS } s 4 , where P is a minimal type such that P : P . Now, out(et) has type ⊥ and by the type inference rule (8) we get P | out(et) : P . Since NS = N S , P { N S } s 4 directly follows from the well-typedness hypothesis. We are only left to show that if P : P with P minimal type then P { N S } s 4 . Suppose that out(t)@' : P : 1 . Then, the type inference rule (3) is the last rule used and 1 ∼ = P ; ' → {o} → ⊥. Since s = ('), the well-typedness hypothesis implies that
Then, the thesis follows by the subtyping rule (u=u) and the fact that NS = N S . Rule (2). Also in this case no new node is created, then we must prove that from s = (') and N S s :: eval(Q)@' : P s :: P = N S well-typed it follows that N S s :: P s :: P | Q = N S is well-typed. With respect to the previous case we are left to show that Q { N S } s 4 where Q is a minimal type such that Q : Q . Suppose that eval(Q)@' : P : 1 . Then, the type inference rule (6) is the last rule used and 1 ∼ = P ; ' → {e} → Q , where P is a minimal type such that P : P . Since s = ('), the well-typedness hypothesis implies that
, where the last equality follows by deÿnition of ↓ t ' and of type of a node. The thesis follows from the fact that NS = N S .
Rule (3). Again the set of nodes of the net is unchanged and we must prove that from s = ('), update( ; t) P : P with P minimal type, match(T<t= ; et; s; P ; NS ) and N S s :: in(t)@' : P s :: out(et) = N S well-typed, it follows that N S s :: The well-typedness hypothesis P { NS } s 4 means that the following facts hold:
. Now, it is easy to verify that the following properties hold:
By using the above properties, the fact that P ⇓ t u 4 u for all (! u : u ) ∈ {t} and the premises of predicate match we can conclude that facts 1. and 2. still hold when the type P ['=˜ ]{ NS } s is considered instead of P { NS } s . Hence, the thesis follows by the monotonicity of type constructors (Corollary 3.7).
Rule (4). This proof is similar to the one above.
Rule 
From the well-typedness hypothesis, from the deÿnitions of type interpretation and of conservative extension, and by using Corollary 3.7, we have
Inductive step: By case analysis on the last operational rule used, namely rule (6) or (7) .
Rule ( Rule (7). By standard inductive arguments and by Proposition 6.1.
We now introduce the notion of run-time error and prove type safety. Run-time errors are deÿned in Table 14 in terms of the predicate N s → error that holds true when within the net N a process P at site s attempts to perform an action that is not allowed by its capabilities. Let us recall that the type of a site codiÿes the policy of access rights and that ↓ p s denotes the access rights of s over s , for s and s sites and type of s.
We rely on the following notation. Given an action a (in(t)@' 1 , out(t)@' 2 ; : : :), cap(a) denotes the corresponding capability (i; o; : : :) and loc(a) denotes the locality name in a (' 1 ; ' 2 ; : : :). Thus, loc(out(t)@') = ' and similarly for the other actions apart The base step is when rule (act) of Table 14 is the only rule used. In this case we have that N = s :: a:P and s :: a:P s → error because ↓ p (loc(a)) {cap(a)}. The thesis obviously holds when a:P is not typable in the type context . Hence, assume that a type exists such that a:P : (without loss of generality, let be a minimal type for a:P). We are left to show that { NS } s 4 . By the type inference rules (3) - (7) in Table 7 We now consider the inductive step. We proceed by case analysis on the last rule applied in the derivation of N Since well-typedness is preserved along sequences of reduction steps, we can conclude that well-typed nets never generate run-time errors during their evolution. Proof. The proof proceeds by induction on the length of N * N . The base step is Theorem 6.3, the inductive step follows from Theorems 6.2 and 6.3.
Remark 6.5. A choice we had to face when designing the type system was that of ÿxing the type to be associated to newly created sites. Our choice was to allow programmers to impose type constraints on the newly created site by explicitly restricting the type of the node where the creating process is running.
Here we brie y discuss the impact of a di erent choice that does not allow programmers to impose type restrictions when creating new sites.
The type inference rule for newloc(u) becomes
and no check is performed on the kind of the operations that P intends to perform at u; the rule only extends the type of P at self with n. The notion of extension needs now to be modiÿed to allow dynamically created nodes to inherit the access rights of the creating one. An extension of a now only depends on s = ∈ S and s ∈ S; and the last item of Deÿnition 5.1 becomes
• for all s 1 ∈ S; (s 1 )(s ) = (s 1 )(s); (s )(s 1 ) = (s)(s 1 ) and (s )(s ) = (s)(s). Moreover, any extension is conservative. The operational rule for newloc does not formally change, but the new deÿnition of extension leads to greater types of the dynamically created nodes.
Programming examples and paradigms
In this section we provide a complete programming example in KLAIM. Then, we illustrate some basic programming paradigms for mobile code applications.
Distributed information retrieval
Distributed information retrieval applications gather information from a set of sources distributed over a network; the nodes to be visited may be determined either statically or dynamically. This kind of application is a paradigmatic example for mobile computation. Here, we present a KLAIM solution of a distributed information retrieval problem and discuss some of the access control issues there involved.
Let us assume that strings, denoted by sequences of characters between quotation marks, are basic values. Consider a user process that needs information about a data of which he only has a key represented, say, by "item", to be used for searching in a database distributed over the network.
In our solution, the distributed database is modelled by located tuple spaces and it is assumed that each local database (a tuple space) reachable from ' item (the starting point of the search which is known by the user process) contains either a tuple of the form ("item"; v) with the required information v; or a tuple of the form ("item"; s next ); with the site of the next node to search.
The user process UP asks for the execution at ' item of the mobile gatherer agent, G; which travels across the nodes looking for tuples containing information associated to "item". This agent takes as parameters the key "item" and a freshly created locality u r that represents the private address where UP would like to receive the result of the search.
The user process UP can be programmed in KLAIM as follows:
The agent G is programmed as follows:
The site dynamically created by UP is accessible only via u r ; hence, if it is assumed that P never communicates the value of u r ; then only processes UP and G can access this site. To guarantee that for continuing the search the gatherer agent receives only sites with appropriate rights, it su ces to choose such that G [u r =u] 4 . If process P has type P ; then the inferred types of UP and G are
Let us now see how types can be used to enforce access control policies by considering a net with three sites s; s 1 and s 2 ; with types s ; s1 and s2 . Assume that s 1 contains the tuple ("item"; s 2 ); s 2 contains the tuple ("item"; v); and the user process UP is at site s and s (' item ) = s 1 . Then, the relevant part of the net is The type of the variable u used by the agent G when reading continuation sites is used statically (by the type inference system) to check whether G [u r =u] 4 ; and dynamically (by the matching predicate) to select the appropriate tuple. For instance, the gatherer agent G can travel from s 1 to s 2 only if the tuple ("item"; s 2 ) can be selected; this amounts to requiring that the interpretation of [s 2 =u ] is less than or equal to s2 .
Code mobility
Mobile code applications are applications running over a network whose distinctive feature is the exploitation of forms of "mobility". Below we ÿrst show how to model code-on-demand, then describe how one can use it together with (non-obvious) type structures to implement "safe" remote evaluation.
Code-on-demand: A component of an application running over a network on a given node, can dynamically download some code from a remote node and link it to perform a given task.
To download code that respects certain type constraints and is stored in a tuple at a remote tuple space l; action read(!X : )@l: X can be used. The downloaded code is checked for access violations at run time by the pattern-matching mechanism. The typing rules for read and in are designed in such a way that any downloaded code whose type is a subtype of will not violate type correctness.
Remote evaluation: Any component of a networking application can invoke services from other components by transmitting both the data needed to perform the service and the code that describes how to perform the service.
To transmit both code P and data v at the locality l of the server, action out(in(!y) @l:A y ; v)@l; where A(x) def = P; can be used. Here, we assume that the server adopts the following (code-on-demand) protocol in(!X : ; !x)@self :out(x)@self :X:
To prevent "damages" from P; the server may mount and execute code P only if [ P ]; the type of the code P when interpreted at the server's site, is such that
where [ ] is the interpretation of at the server's site.
Type may give only minimal access permissions on the server's site, for instance, only the capability of reading some resources and giving back the results of the execution. In this case, [ ] is of the form s → {r} → ⊥; s 0 → {o} → ⊥; s 1 → {o} → ⊥; : : : s n → {o} → ⊥; where s i ; i = 0; : : : ; n, are the sites with the rights of invoking server's facilities, and s is the server's site.
Notice, however, that this does not prevent P from visiting other sites. In particular, agent P may be programmed in such a way that after having performed the required elaboration, it transmits code Q at the locality l i (the logical name of site s i ):
It is immediate to see that, if we assume that the client is allocated at site s 0 and that
However, code Q is only stored in the tuple space at s i : no new thread of execution is activated at site s i . Before being executed code Q must be read and veriÿed (dynamic type checking). Therefore, process P cannot activate a Trojan horse at the remote site s i .
Detailed proofs
In this section we present the proofs of some syntactical properties of the KLAIM type system, that have been skipped or just sketched in the earlier sections. Proof. A simple (innermost) procedure to reduce to can be deÿned as follows. First, by (8) , erase all -binders that bind no variables and, by (9) , reduce sequences of -binders, that is rewrite 1 : : : : n : as : [ = 1 ; : : : ; = n ] and erase any i = in : 1 ; : : : ; n . Then, reduce union types via a two-step procedure. By (1) -(5), erase components that are ⊥ or repetition (possibly use (7)), and absorb in other components. By (7) and, possibly, (8) and (9) fold all operators as much as possible, so that no components of the union type is a -type and sequences of -types are reduced to only one -type. Finally, once a type of the form : 1 ; : : : ; n or 1 ; : : : ; n is obtained, such that all i are canonical, then use (6) to rewrite 1 ; : : : ; n so that Proof. Consider the following algorithm for proving 1 Soundness of the decision algorithm follows from the fact that steps 3, 4 and 6 have a direct correspondent in the subtyping rules, while step 5 corresponds to applying either ( →= ) or ( = →), plus ( →= →). We are left to prove that the algorithm terminates. This proof proceeds by induction on the cardinality of Sub( 1 ) ∪ Sub( 2 ); the set of subterms of the types 1 and 2 (by deÿnition, this cardinality cannot become smaller than 2). Since on polarities and ∼ = on types are decidable, termination of the decision algorithm follows from the fact that steps 1 and 2 do not generate subgoals, while steps 3-6 generate new subgoals with a smaller set of subterms.
For proving existence of the minimal type, we need some technical preliminaries. P : in the proof system; where A(X :˜ ;ũ :˜ ;x) def = P and no process identiÿer other than A occurs in P. Then; there exists a minimal type such that (i) ;X :˜ ; A : P : is derivable; (ii) 4 .
Proof. The assumption that no process identiÿer other than A occurs in P implies that rule (9) is not used in D but in the last step. Then the minimal type can be constructed in the following way. Assume that the process identiÿer A has type , where is a fresh type variable. For any occurrence of A P ;';ẽ in P assume A P ;';ẽ : ['=ũ] without applying the substitution. As a consequence, the type derivation for P relies on a set of hypotheses (i.e. type constraints involving ) which must be checked later.
By considering the rules of Table 7 except for (9), it is easy to verify that our type derivations have the form . This gives a derivation of the minimal type = ( ) for P, which is sound only if subtyping constraints involving , not yet evaluated, are satisÿed. These constraints can now be checked since types, not type schemata, are dealt with. The checking will be successful by construction if all the intentions of P onũ (registered in the minimal type) agree with the type declared for the parameters; otherwise P is untypable and the algorithm fails.
For point (ii), because of the deterministic construction of the type for P except for the case A(X :˜ ;ũ :˜ ;x) def = P, we have that must codify at least all the intentions of P which are in 1 minimal type). Hence, is such that = ( ) where = : 2 ; { 1 = 2 [' 1 =ũ 1 ]; : : : ; n = 2 [' n =ũ n ]} , and 1 4 2 . Therefore, by Proposition 8.5, = ( ) 4 ( ) = .
Since our types are monotonic with respect to type substitution, the previous lemma can be immediately generalized to the case where process identiÿers other than A occur in the body P of the deÿnition of A.
Corollary 8.7. Let ;X :˜ ; A : ; A 1 : 1 ; : : : ; A n : n P : where A(X :˜ ;ũ :˜ ;x) def = P and all process identiÿers occurring in P are in {A; A 1 ; : : : ; A n }. Let 1 ; : : : ; n such that; for any A i (X i :˜ ;ũ i :˜ ;x i ) def = P i (16i6n); ;X i :˜ ; A 1 : 1 ; : : : ; A i : i : : : ; A n : n P i : i implies i 4 i . Then; there exists a minimal type for P such that ;X :˜ ; A : ; A 1 : 1 ; : : : ; A n : n P : and 4 .
We can now prove existence of the minimal type for a given P typable in .
Theorem 8.8 (Theorem 4.5). If P : for some ; then there exists a minimal type such that P : and 4 for all such that P : .
Proof. The minimal type of P can be deÿned, in a trivial way, by structural induction on P, from the minimal types of its subterms. The only interesting case concerns occurrences of process deÿnitions in P. For any process deÿnition, the algorithm deÿned in the proof of Lemma 8.6 is used to obtain the minimal type. The statement can now be proven by induction on the length of the derivation of P : . Base step: All cases are trivial but rule (9) , for which use Lemma 8.6. Inductive step: Apply directly the inductive hypothesis. It su ces to notice that in each inference rule the type of the term in the consequent is greater than the type of the subterms in the antecedent and that type constructors are monotonic. In the case of rule (9), the proof follows from Corollary 8.7.
Concluding remarks
We have developed a type system which formalizes access control restrictions of programs written in KLAIM. Type information is used to specify access rights and execution privileges, and to detect violations of these policies. The implementation of the type inference system for X-KLAIM (the prototype implementation of KLAIM) is in progress; it will help us also to assess our design choices.
Recently, distributed variants of the -calculus have been introduced (e.g. Ambient Calculus [13] and D [25] ) as foundational calculi for network programming. Syntactically, these calculi are very di erent from KLAIM, however simple variations of KLAIM types can be applied to them to specify and enforce access control policies.
We plan to extend the type system by introducing types for tuples (record types), notions of multi-level security (by structuring localities into levels of security) and public or shared keys to model dynamic transmission of access rights. Ideas could also be borrowed from the spi-calculus [2] , a concurrent calculus obtained by adding public-key encryption primitives to the -calculus [29] , and from the SLam calculus [24] , another calculus where information about direct=indirect producers and consumers are associated to data.
Another direction for future research is considering "open" systems. In fact, our type system can safely deal with new processes landing on existing nodes, but it does not consider partially speciÿed nets. An enrichment of types is then needed to specify the permissions granted to "unspeciÿed" sites. Then, the choice has to be faced whether this enrichment should be speciÿed at the level of single nodes or at the level of nets. Interfacing nets would naturally ÿt with extensions of our framework to hierarchical nets that would be beneÿcial also for more structured access controls. An alternative approach to deal with open systems could also be that of relaxing the static type checking phase by not requiring well-typedness of the whole net (this corresponds to the fact that only the typed sites can be trusted) while increasing the run-time type checking phase, e.g. agents migrating from untyped (i.e. untrusted) sites must be dynamically typechecked. This is the approach followed in [34] .
Type systems have been used also for other calculi of mobile processes. Among those reminiscent of ours, although not addressing security issues, we mention the work of Pierce and Sangiorgi [32] . They develop a type system for the -calculus using channels types to specify whether channels are used to read or to write. This type system has been extended in [26] by associating multiplicities to types for stating the number of times each channel can be used. The type system of [32] has been also generalized by Sewell [35] to capture locality of channel names and by Boreale and Sangiorgi [10] to trimmer bisimulation proofs.
Only recently attempts have been made to characterize security properties in terms of formal type systems. A type system for the spi-calculus has been developed by Abadi [1] to guarantee secrecy of cryptographic protocols. Abadi and Stata [3] have used type rules to specify and verify correctness of Java Bytecode Veriÿer. Hennessy and Riely [25] have introduced a type system for the language D . This work is similar to ours (types are abstraction of process behaviours and access rights violations are type errors), but the technical developments are quite di erent; resources are channels and types describe permissions to use channels. Moreover, access rights are ÿxed irrespectively of the localities where processes themselves are executed. In [34] , the type system of [25] has been improved for considering nets where sites can set up malicious agents that do not respect the rules on the use of resources. Cardelli and Gordon [14] have introduced a type system for mobile ambients [13] that controls the type of the values exchanged among administrative domains (ambients) so that the communication of values cannot cause run-time faults. Volpano and Smith have developed type systems to ensure secure information ow (noninterference) for both a sequential procedural language [38] and for a multithreaded imperative language [39] . Boudol [11] has used types to abstract from terms the possible sequences of interactions and the resources used by processes. Necula [30] has introduced an approach to ensure correctness of mobile code with respect to a ÿxed safety policy, where code producers provide the code with a proof of correctness that code consumers check before allowing the code to execute. Vitek and Castagna [37] have proposed a language-based approach, relying on powerful mobility and protection primitives, rather than on type systems, for secure Internet programming. Bodei et al. [9] have proposed an alternative approach for the analysis of security and of information ow, that relies on static analysis techniques.
